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The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), delivered an interesting judgment in the case 
of Tölle v. Croatia about insulting allegations of domestic violence. In a newspaper article a 
father accused an association to be responsible for his child’s abduction by the mother. The 
president of this association providing support for women victims of violence replied in a ra-
dio-interview that her organisation was not involved in the daughter’s abduction and that the 
man had violently abused his wife. That was also the reason why mother and daughter had 
fled the country. The association’s president was subsequently convicted for the criminal of-
fence of insult. The ECtHR found that this criminal conviction amounted to a violation of the 
association’s president’s freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court finds the criminal conviction for insult a sort of censor-




The applicant in this case is Ms Neva Tölle, the president of the Zagreb Autonomous 
Women’s House (‘the Association’), an association that supports women victims of vio-
lence. The Association had intervened in a family dispute between a certain D.O. and his wife 
C.O. following a request for help from the latter. C.O. and the couple’s minor daughter stayed 
for several months at the Association’s refuge for women, and afterwards C.O. took the child 
abroad. A daily newspaper published an interview with D.O. in which he alleged that the As-
sociation was responsible for the fact that his daughter had been kidnapped by her mother. 
The same day Ms Tölle explained the circumstances of the Association’s actions in the case 
and denied its involvement in child abduction. She stated that D.O. had been abusing his wife 
and she added: 
 
‘practice – not only that of [the Association], but also that of all [women’s] refuges in 
the world – has shown that victims speak about only one third of what they have been 
through, not everything. That means that there was certainly much more to it than 
what C.O. managed to tell us; women are ashamed to speak about it in detail, so I do 
not have any doubt that C.O. was a victim of abuse [perpetrated] by her husband 
D.O.’ 
 
Ms. Tölle also said that the criticism by D.O. on her Association was to present the abuser as 
the victim and the victim as the abuser. She called this a ‘burning issue’ and ‘absolutely unac-
ceptable in domestic violence cases’. 
 
A few weeks later D.O. brought a private criminal prosecution against Ms Tölle on charges of 
defamation relating to her allegations that he had abused his wife. Ms Tölle was found guilty 
of insult, finding that she had tarnished D.O.’s honour and reputation by alleging that he had 
abused his wife. The domestic courts were of the opinion that the accusation at issue could not 
be qualified as defamation, but as insult. By referring to D.O. as an abuser, Ms Tölle had 
stated a negative opinion of him that was ‘objectively insulting’. Ms Tölle was sanctioned 
with a judicial admonition and ordered to pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings, as 
well as the expenses incurred to D.O. and to his lawyer. Both an appeal before a second-in-
stance court and before the Constitutional Court were dismissed. 
 
Before the ECtHR, Ms Tölle complained that her criminal conviction had violated her right to 
freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. She argued that she had merely exer-
cised her constitutionally-guaranteed right of reply to D.O.’s accusations that the Association 
was responsible for the abduction of his minor daughter. Ms Tölle submitted that she had rea-
sonable grounds to believe that D.O. had abused his wife, referring to the direct testimony of 
the victim, the proceedings for domestic violence in D.O.’s family, her experience in working 
with female victims of domestic abuse for a decade, and the statements of two witnesses. Ms 
Tölle also argued that the private prosecution had aimed to censor her work and the work of 
similar associations. She had been sentenced in criminal proceedings for a crime she had not 
committed, and anxiety regarding a potential claim for damages had to some extent deter-
mined her behaviour in the years following the impugned judgment. 
 
Judgment 
The domestic courts based Ms Tölle’s conviction on the offence of insult as provided for 
in Article 199(2) of the Criminal Code, and the ECtHR accepts that the interference with the 
applicant’s right in the present case was prescribed by law. Neither was it in dispute that the 
interference had pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others, 
namely the honour and reputation of D.O. What remained to be established was whether that 
interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, in conformity with Article 10 § 2 ECHR 
and the Court’s case law.  
 
The ECtHR first notes that the present case concerns a conflict between concurrent rights, 
namely, on the one hand, D.O.’s right to reputation as part of his private life, and on the other 
hand Ms Tölle’s right to freedom of expression. Referring to Axel Springer AG v. Germany 
and Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, the ECtHR evaluates:  
1. whether the radio-interview at issue was about a matter of public interest,  
2. how well-known D.O. was and the subject and context of the interview,  
3. the prior conduct of D.O., 
4. the content, form and consequences of the radio-interview and  
5. the severity of the sanction imposed on Ms Tölle.  
 
The ECtHR considers that the central issue discussed in the radio-interview was about vio-
lence against women and domestic violence, an issue of important public interest and the sub-
ject of a social debate, ‘both at the material time and today’. As D.O. had given an interview 
in a national daily newspaper, he had entered the arena of public debate, and therefore he 
should have had a higher threshold of tolerance towards any criticism directed at him. Fur-
thermore D.O. had publicly accused the Association managed by Ms Tölle of a serious crimi-
nal act in the media. In such circumstances, and bearing in mind that the right of rectification 
or of reply falls within the scope of Article 10 ECHR, Ms Tölle could not have been expected 
to remain passive and not to defend the Association’s reputation. 
 
The ECtHR finds that in assessing the nature of the impugned statements, the domestic courts 
limited their analysis to the fact that D.O. had never been convicted of domestic violence. The 
ECtHR reiterates however, that although a final criminal conviction amounts to incontroverti-
ble proof that a person has committed an offence, it is unreasonable to similarly circumscribe 
the manner in which allegations about that person’s criminal conduct are proved in the con-
text of a defamation or insult case. The ECtHR also holds that the domestic courts did not em-
bark on an analysis of whether Ms Tölle had had reasonable grounds to believe that D.O. had 
actually abused his wife. The ECtHR refers to the fact that Ms Tölle’s association had pro-
vided C.O. with shelter for several months and that witnesses had testified that there had been 
some sort of police interventions and allegations of domestic violence in D.O.’s family. In-
stead of pertinently evaluating the context of the comments by Ms Tölle, the domestic courts 
merely classified the impugned statement as a value judgment expressing a negative opinion 
of D.O. which had been objectively insulting to him. 
 
With regard to the nature of the interference with Ms Tölle’s freedom of expression the EC-
tHR is of the opinion that the penalty imposed on her was mild, but that it nonetheless con-
sisted of a criminal conviction, and consequently an entry on Ms Tölle’s criminal record. The 
ECtHR recognises that the sanction itself did not prevent Ms Tölle from remaining involved 
in the Association’s activity, but the ECtHR finds that the criminal conviction nevertheless 
amounted to a sort of censorship which might have discouraged her from promoting the Asso-
ciation’s statutory aims in the future. The ECtHR also finds that the criminal conviction 
strengthened D.O.’s chances of obtaining damages against Ms Tölle in civil proceedings. 
 
The ECtHR, sitting as a Committee, concludes that the domestic courts failed to take into ac-
count that Ms Tölle had been exercising her right of reply in relation to a serious accusation 
made against an association of which she was the president. Neither have the domestic courts 
carried out an adequate proportionality analysis with a view to assessing the overall context in 
which the impugned expressions had been used and their factual basis. They thus exceeded 
the margin of appreciation afforded to them and failed to strike a reasonable balance of pro-
portionality between the measures restricting Ms Tölle’s right to freedom of expression and 
the legitimate aim pursued of the protection of the reputation or the rights of others. There has 
accordingly been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
 
Comment 
The judgment in Tölle v. Croatia considers violence against women and domestic violence an 
issue of important public interest ‘both at the material time and today’. Indeed international 
reports indicate that globally an immense number of women have experienced physical and/or 
sexual intimate partner violence, or sexual violence by a non-partner. Calls to helplines have 
increased five-fold in some countries because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Restricted move-
ment, social isolation, and economic insecurity are increasing women’s vulnerability to vio-
lence in the home around the world (UN Secretary General Report (2020) on Intensification of 
efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women). The Council of Europe’s website on 
Gender Equality reports that ‘violence against women is the most common violation of 
women’s human rights in Europe’, while progress with policy and legal reform to tackle this 
phenomenon is slow. In such a context a holistic and systemic approach is needed to eliminate 
all forms of violence against women. This includes the support and encouragements of the work 
of NGOs involved in combating domestic violence and violence against women (see Recom-
mendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the protection of 
women against violence). From this perspective the judgment in Tölle v. Croatia contains an 
important message to those who are providing women victims of violence with support, a mes-
sage not to keep silent, to create awareness on the issue and to react on victim blaming, includ-
ing by (alleged) perpetrators of violence against women.  
 
It is deplorable however that it took so long time before this message was received. During the 
17 years the case was pending, there has been, in the terms of the ECtHR itself, a sort of cen-
sorship hindering Ms Tölle to speak out freely in support of victims of domestic violence and 
to play her role as president of an organisation providing women victims of violence with sup-
port. The domestic proceedings lasted nine years and it took another eight years at the Stras-
bourg Court before a Committee of three judges delivered the judgment finding a violation of 
the applicant’s right in this case, explicitly referring to the important matter of public interest 
that was covered by the impugned statements about domestic violence and violence against 
women. As violence against women is the most common violation of women’s human rights in 
Europe, this judgment is an example of delayed justice and even denied justice for too long 
time for those in the frontline giving support to victims of domestic violence. 
 
The judgment at the same time confirms the importance and the urgency of guaranteeing a 
better protection against domestic violence. In several cases of domestic violence against 
women, the ECtHR has found violations of the ECHR, in particular with regard to Article 2, 3 
and 14 and the states’ positive obligations in relation to these articles (see e.g. Volodina v. 
Russia (blog); Talpis v. Italy (blog); Opuz v. Turkey and Halime Kilic v. Turkey). In Volodina 
v. Russia the ECtHR stated that ‘there is a common understanding in the relevant international 
material that comprehensive legal and other measures are necessary to provide victims of do-
mestic violence with effective protection and safeguards’. It found in particular that the author-
ities had tolerated ‘a climate which was conducive to domestic violence’. In Opuz v. Turkey the 
ECtHR stressed that domestic violence ‘is a general problem which concerns all member 
States’. The importance of this issue as a ‘general problem’ is also reflected in Tölle v. Croatia. 
Domestic violence against women, in its different forms, is still not sufficiently recognised as 
‘real violence’. The chilling effect caused by the criminal conviction of the president of an 
organisation protecting and supporting victims of domestic violence might therefore contribute 
to further tabooing of domestic violence. Silencing Ms Tölle had as a consequence that the 
underlying problem of domestic violence in this case, and  in many other cases, was not revealed 
nor discussed. The ECtHR also criticises the approach by the domestic courts limiting their 
analysis to the fact that D.O. had never been convicted of domestic violence. The position of 
the ECtHR that ‘it is unreasonable’ to require proof of a criminal conviction with regard to 
allegations in the context of a defamation or insult case, is  a very relevant one where allegations 
of domestic violence are concerned. Only in very few cases domestic violence is prosecuted, 
and it is even more rare that the perpetrator is convicted or sanctioned. Therefore, it is important 
that the ECtHR also refers to other circumstances and ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that D.O. 
had actually abused his wife. With the judgment in Tölle v. Croatia the ECtHR contributes to 
greater awareness of the real problem – how to report,  reveal and discuss cases in order to 
prevent and stop domestic violence. 
 
Tölle v. Croatia is another step in the ECtHR’s deconstruction of a male-oriented approach by 
domestic authorities in the domain of protection of privacy and reputation and the right to free-
dom of expression. In Bodrožić and Vuijn v. Serbia the Court could not accept that comparing 
a man with a blonde woman was an insult for men. Two journalists had criticized a well-known 
lawyer in a sharp and satirical style, comparing the lawyer with a blonde woman. The journalists 
were convicted because it was considered ‘insulting to feminise a man’. The ECtHR was struck 
by the argument of the domestic courts, as later endorsed by the Serbian government, ‘that 
comparing an adult man to a blonde woman constituted an attack on the integrity and dignity 
of men’, and that such a comparison was ‘objectively insulting within their society’. The ECtHR 
found such an argumentation ‘derisory and unacceptable’. The Grand Chamber in Couderc and 
Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France (see also our blog) was especially critical of the French 
domestic courts’ failure to weigh up the Prince of Monaco’s right to privacy with the right of 
Ms Coste, the mother of his illegitimate child. The French courts found that an interview in 
Paris Match with Ms Coste about her relation with the Prince, her pregnancy and how the 
Prince behaved towards the child at his birth and afterwards had breached the Prince’s right to 
privacy. The judgment of the ECtHR honored in particular Ms Coste’s right to reveal her story 
of the relationship, including the story about their child. By emphasizing that Ms Coste “was 
certainly not bound to silence’ the ECtHR challenged the male-orientated view in France on 
keeping silence over having a mistress and a  common child. The judgment made clear that the 
approach by the French courts could not be justified solely on the basis of the right to privacy 
or the right to reputation of the Prince, but had to be balanced pertinently with the right to 
freedom of expression and the right of Ms Coste to tell her story. In Tölle v. Croatia the ECtHR 
criticizes the approach by the domestic authorities, not only in terms of a lack of proper balanc-
ing between the conflicting rights at issue, but also because of the insufficient attention to the 
impact of the conviction of Ms Tölle. The ECtHR indeed emphasizes that the criminal convic-
tion of Ms Tölle resulted in a sort of censorship which might have discouraged her from pro-
moting her organisation’s statutory aims of protecting and supporting women victims of do-
mestic violence. Hence the criminal conviction of Ms Tölle hindered her in her position as the 
association’s president to help to create awareness about violence against women in her country 
and to oppose against a climate conducive to domestic violence. The judgment gives support to 
those who stand up for a better protection of victims of domestic violence and to those who 
dare to come forward with their stories or counter discourses of victim blaming.  
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